With the gradual implementation and application of the notification commitment system in many administrative license approval fields, the application of the notification commitment system in the field of environmental impact assessment of construction projects has also aroused a lot of discussion in the academic circle, because there are problems such as the substantive record system in the application process of EIA, which is contrary to the internal logic of the EIA system. At the same time, for the punishment of false promises, most of the pilot areas are only in the form of revoking administrative permission and supplemented by credit punishment, which is difficult to produce a good deterrent to false promises. After analyzing the current situation of punishment for false promises, this paper finds that there are deficiencies in both punishment links and in-process and post-event supervision links. This paper combines the expected return model of false promises, the maximum deterrent effect model and the expenditure discount index model of false promises. Some suggestions are put forward to increase the severity of punishment for false promises, reduce the cost of punishment, reduce the discount rate of punishment, and improve the probability of false promises being punished. |