论对环评告知承诺制虚假承诺惩罚
On the punishment of false promise in EIA notification commitment system
DOI:
中文关键词:  告知承诺制  环境影响评价  虚假承诺
英文关键词:informing commitment system  Environmental impact assessment  False promises
基金项目:国家社科基金
作者单位邮编
吴满昌* 昆明理工大学法学院 650504
汪洋 昆明理工大学法学院 650504
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中文摘要:
      随着告知承诺制在多个行政许可审批领域开始逐步推行适用,告知承诺制在建设项目环境影响评价领域的适用也引起了学界很多讨论,因其在环评适用过程中存在实质上的备案制等问题,这与环评制度内在逻辑相悖。与此同时,对于虚假承诺的惩罚,多数试点地区仅以撤销行政许可并辅以信用惩罚的形式,很难对虚假承诺行为产生较好的威慑力。本文对虚假承诺惩罚现状进行分析后认为,其在惩罚环节和事中事后监管环节均存在不足,结合虚假承诺预期收益模型、最高威慑效果模型、虚假承诺的支出贴现指数模型进行研究,在加大对虚假承诺惩罚严厉程度、降低惩罚成本、降低惩罚贴现率、提升虚假承诺被惩罚概率等方面提出相关完善建议。
英文摘要:
      With the gradual implementation and application of the notification commitment system in many administrative license approval fields, the application of the notification commitment system in the field of environmental impact assessment of construction projects has also aroused a lot of discussion in the academic circle, because there are problems such as the substantive record system in the application process of EIA, which is contrary to the internal logic of the EIA system. At the same time, for the punishment of false promises, most of the pilot areas are only in the form of revoking administrative permission and supplemented by credit punishment, which is difficult to produce a good deterrent to false promises. After analyzing the current situation of punishment for false promises, this paper finds that there are deficiencies in both punishment links and in-process and post-event supervision links. This paper combines the expected return model of false promises, the maximum deterrent effect model and the expenditure discount index model of false promises. Some suggestions are put forward to increase the severity of punishment for false promises, reduce the cost of punishment, reduce the discount rate of punishment, and improve the probability of false promises being punished.
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