陈海贝,赵湘莲.考虑不同合作模式和多方奖惩的绿色信贷风险优化控制研究[J].中国环境管理,2024,16(1):88-106.
CHEN Haibei,ZHAO Xianglian.Research on Optimal Control of Green Credit Risk Considering Different Cooperation Modes and Multiple Rewards and Punishments[J].Chinese Journal of Environmental Management,2024,16(1):88-106.
考虑不同合作模式和多方奖惩的绿色信贷风险优化控制研究
Research on Optimal Control of Green Credit Risk Considering Different Cooperation Modes and Multiple Rewards and Punishments
DOI:10.16868/j.cnki.1674-6252.2024.01.088
中文关键词:  绿色信贷  绿色信贷风险  优化控制  风险优化
英文关键词:green credit  green credit risk  optimal control  risk optimization
基金项目:“江苏省社科应用研究精品工程”财经发展专项课题一般项目“绿色信贷风险监测及优化控制研究”(22SCB-36);安徽省教育厅自然科学研究重点项目“基于信息网络技术扩散的城市经济韧性研究”(KJ2020A1073)。
作者单位
陈海贝 南京航空航天大学经济与管理学院, 江苏南京 211106 
赵湘莲 南京航空航天大学经济与管理学院, 江苏南京 211106 
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中文摘要:
      绿色信贷风险的优化控制,有利于推动绿色信贷的稳定、可持续发展,实现环境效益、经济效益和社会效益的共赢。本研究将政府部门、环保部门、金融机构和企业的行为纳入同一个理论体系中,充分考虑影响参与主体最优努力水平和绿色信贷风险最优轨迹的环境因素、经济因素和社会因素。在此基础上,构建不同合作模式下的绿色信贷风险优化控制模型,分析不同情境下参与主体的努力水平,比较绿色信贷风险的最优轨迹,找出绿色信贷风险优化控制存在的问题及原因。研究结果表明:第一,四方合作模式对绿色信贷风险的优化控制具有明显的优势。第二,政府的参与能够有效带动其余合作者的积极性。第三,金融机构和企业之间,存在明显的利益共存和投入互动关系。第四,补贴和惩罚措施在合作过程中能够产生激励和约束作用,但在非合作模式下发挥的作用比较有限。第五,参与主体的协同水平越高,越有利于绿色信贷风险的优化控制。因此,需要灵活运用行政、经济或法律等多种干预手段,并对补贴用途进行考评和增强舆论监督,防止金融机构和企业将绿色补贴挪作他用。同时,建立符合国内绿色信贷发展特点的风险标准,统一绿色信贷风险的评判和管控依据。
英文摘要:
      The optimal control of green credit risk is conducive to promoting the stable and sustainable development of green credit and realizing the win-win situation of environmental, economic and social benefits. This study integrates the behaviors of government department, environmental protection department, financial institution and enterprise into the same theoretical system, fully considering the environmental factors, economic factors and social factors that affect the optimal effort level of participants and the optimal trajectory of green credit risk. On this basis, the paper constructs the optimal control model of green credit risk under different cooperation modes, analyzes the effort level of participants under different situations, compares the optimal trajectory of green credit risk, and finds out the problems and causes of the optimal control of green credit risk. The results show that the four-party cooperation mode has obvious advantages in the optimal control of green credit risk. Second, the participation of the government can effectively stimulate the enthusiasm of the remaining partners. Third, there are obvious interest coexistence and input interaction between financial institution and enterprise. Fourth, subsidies and punishment measures can stimulate and constrain the cooperation process, but play a limited role in the non-cooperative mode. Fifth, the higher the level of synergy of participants, the more conducive to the optimal control of green credit risk. Therefore, it is necessary to flexibly use a variety of intervention means, evaluate the use of subsidies and strengthen public opinion supervision, to prevent financial institution and enterprise from misappropriating green subsidies for other purposes. At the same time, it needs to establish risk standards that meet the characteristics of domestic green credit development, and unify the evaluation and control basis of green credit risk.
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